news from 2009

22.12.2009

Luminar / Lucien Barriere casino joint venture dismissed
Tuesday, December 22, 2009

In the last casino application heard under the Gaming Act 1968, Leeds Crown Court has dismissed the appeal of Waterimage Limited to operate the former Majestic Nightclub as a casino. Waterimage is a partnership between UK’s largest nightclub operator Luminar Leisure and the French casino operators Lucien Barriere. The nightclub, a grand Victorian building in City Square, has remained empty since Luminar moved its business elsewhere in the city. The proposal was for an entertainment-led casino including a sports bar, disco, piano bar, restaurant.

The Judge, sitting with four Justices, concluded that these features did not amount to gaming within the meaning of the 1968 Act, and that there was no unmet demand for actual gaming facilities in Leeds, given the existence of competitive facilities operated by Gala, LCI, Grosvenor and Napoleons. She also refused to exercise her discretion to grant a licence, holding the absence of demand and the existence of competition were important factors. Importantly, she considered economic and regeneration factors to be irrelevant to the purpose of the 1968 legislation. Furthermore, all of those factors could be deployed in the competitive process contemplated by the Gambling Act 2005, Leeds having been awarded the right by Parliament to award a large casino licence.

Gala Casinos was represented by Philip Kolvin QC

Grosvenor Casinos was represented by Stephen Walsh QC

LCI was represented by Martin Walsh QC

Waterimage was represented by Gerald Gouriet QC

17.12.2009

2-3 Gray's Inn Square wishes everyone Seasons Greetings
Thursday, December 17, 2009

We are not sending any cards this year, but have instead sent a donation to the Christopher Hatton Primary School, Camden which is currently fundraising to convert a car park into a playground for children at the school.

Regards
Lynne Orsborn

09.12.2009

Supreme Court rules on developers? rights of connection
Wednesday, December 09, 2009

In one of its first judgments the new Supreme Court has ruled on developers’ rights of connection to public drainage infrastructure, in Barratt Homes Limited v DCC [2009] UKSC 13.

Barratts succeeded on both the points raised by the case. The Court held that Welsh Water (DCC) had no right to refuse connection at Barratts’ chosen point of connection under s106 of the Water Industry Act 1991 or to direct a different point of connection. It also held that where undertakers’ statutory powers under s106 come into play, failure to act within the time prescribed will prevent them from being exercised.

Anthony Porten QC and Steven Gasztowicz QC argued the case on behalf of Barratts before the House of Lords in July, assisted by Clare Parry.

This was one of the last cases ever to be heard in the House of Lords and the argument took place in the Chamber itself to mark the occasion. The judgment was given by Lord Phillips, President of the new Supreme Court, today.

Click here for full text

12.11.2009

Chambers and Partners 2010
Thursday, November 12, 2009

This year’s edition of the Chambers and Partners guide was launched on Wednesday 11th November. Chambers improved on last year's rankings with a greater number of members recognised and this is a tribute to the expertise in our areas of practice across the board in Chambers.

Admin and Public Law

Silks: Mark Lowe QC
Juniors: Thomas Cosgrove

Consumer

Chambers
Silks: Anthony Scrivener QC
Juniors: Geoffrey Stephenson, Peter Miller

Crime

Juniors: Gerard Forlin

Environment

Chambers
Silks: James Findlay QC

Health & Safety

Juniors: Gerard Forlin

Licensing

Chambers
Silks: David Matthias QC, James Findlay QC, Philip Kolvin QC

Local Government

Chambers
Silks: James Findlay QC, Mark Lowe QC, Morag Ellis QC, Anthony Porten QC
Juniors: Ranjit Bhose, Mary Cook, Robin Green, Wayne Beglan, Bryan McGuire, Melissa Murphy, Damien Welfare

Planning

Chambers
Silks: Mark Lowe QC, Morag Ellis QC, Anthony Porten QC, Anthony Dinkin QC, Simon Bird QC
Juniors: Mary Cook, Michael Bedford, Richard Ground, Celina Colquhoun, Thomas Cosgrove, Paul Shadarevian

Social Housing

Chambers
Juniors: Ranjit Bhose,Bryan McGuire, Kelvin Rutledge, Wayne Beglan, Jon Holbrook, Sian Davies, Peggy Etiebet

Click here for further information

04.11.2009

Steven Gasztowicz QC
Wednesday, November 04, 2009

We are proud to announce that the Queen has appointed Steven Gasztowicz QC to be a Recorder on the South Eastern Circuit.

19.10.2009

Public Law Housing Issues: The fall-out from Kay and Doherty and Homelessness post Ali (Aweys) and Moran
Monday, October 19, 2009

2-3 Gray’s Inn Square was pleased to host this essential guide to the latest Housing issues faced by Public Autorities.

Speakers from chambers included James Findlay QC as chair with Wayne Beglan, Kuljit Bhogal, Jennifer Oscroft, Catherine Rowlands and Kelvin Rutledge.

Topics covered on the day included:

• Kay and Doherty: the current law (Click here for the slides)
• Kay and Doherty: practical issues (Click here for the slides)
• Homelessness post-Aweys: the state of play and practical issues: (Click here for the slides)

07.10.2009

Housing Association excludes paedophile from its property
Wednesday, October 07, 2009

Knightstone Housing Association has obtained an injunction excluding the partner of one of its tenants from the street in which he hoped to live.

John Horton has a history of paedophile behaviour, starting with a conviction for indecent assault on a girl under 16 in 1996. Following the introduction of Sexual Offences Prevention Orders, the local Police, concerned about reports that Horton had young, vulnerable girls in his house and car, obtained an order banning Horton from contact with young girls for life. He breached the SOPO and was sent to prison for 18 months. Horton also had convictions for kidnapping, GBH and offences of dishonesty.

Over the time Horton resided in the street, neighbours complained that he was using the property for running a car repair business. They complained that he was threatening and intimidating. There were also complaints about his inappropriate behaviour with young girls. One resident told the Court that Horton had wolf-whistled at his young daughter, who was too scared to pass Horton’s property and had to go the long way round if she left the Close. Another resident told the Court that young girls were seen at the property, drinking, and that Horton was seen to smack their bottoms.

The landlord sought an injunction restraining Horton from returning to the street – home to 19 girls under the age of 16. The District Judge granted the injunction for a period of 5 years, stating that the Defendant was “a law unto himself” with no concern for the rights of his neighbours to the peaceful and safe enjoyment of their homes; he commenced their courage in coming to Court to give evidence despite the aura of intimidation emanating from the Defendant.

Catherine Rowlands instructed by Anthony Collins Solicitors LLP represented Knightstone.

06.10.2009

Nicholas Nardecchia
Tuesday, October 06, 2009

Chambers is sorry to announce that Nicholas has decided to retire from the Bar, after 35 successful years in practice. Nicholas commenced his practice at 8 New Square and from the outset developed a very successful planning practice. In more recent years he has been involved in several very substantial Lands Tribunal cases, taking him to the Court of Appeal and more recently the House of Lords.

We wish him, and his wife, Yami, all the very best for a long and happy retirement. If you wish to contact Nicholas, his e-mail address will remain open for some time or we can arrange to forward any e-mails if you send them to martinh@cornerstonebarristers.com.

26.09.2009

Door supervisors: approved contractor scheme
Saturday, September 26, 2009

A night-club owner has been ordered to use door-staff exclusively from employers who have Approved Contractor Status from the Security Industry Authority.

In September 2008, Surrey Police applied for a review of the premises licence held by Harpers Nightclub in Guildford, following a spate of attacks on customers by door supervisors. Guildford Borough Council’s Licensing Sub-Committee imposed a series of conditions on the club, including the obligation to record activity in the club on CCTV and the requirement to use door staff who were employed by Approved Contractors.

A judicial review challenge to the decision on the grounds of abuse of process failed in the High Court in July, although an application for permission to appeal has been made to the Court of Appeal.

The premises licence holder also appealed to Guildford Magistrates Court. On 23rd September 2009, a consent order was agreed, giving the premises licence holder itself nine months to attain Approved Contractor Status, following which all staff would have to come from Approved Contractors. An interim arrangement was also agreed, requiring an independent audit of the door supervisor function after 6 months.

While the Approved Contractor scheme is a voluntary, it is based on widely recognised business improvement models such as ISO9001, and ensures the contractor has met a series of gold standards including having processes in place to ensure a consistent quality of service delivery, training programmes and corporate social responsibility. The Guildford case demonstrates how it can be used to give greater assurance to statutory agencies and the wider community that door supervisors will be able to play a full part in the promotion of the licensing objectives.

The consent order also required CCTV along forced ejection routes and the surrounding pavements, and the ability for the system to record the faces of all persons entering the club under any lighting conditions.

The premises licence holder was ordered to pay the Council’s costs in the sum of £28,900.

The Council was represented by Philip Kolvin QC.

The club was represented by Kevin de Haan QC.

16.09.2009

Welsh homes reconsidered
Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Mark Lowe QC and Clare Parry spent three weeks last summer representing Cardiff County Council and RAG (the local residents group) respectively into the second inquiry into Western Power’s proposals to redevelop this reservoir which is seen by the Council and the objectors as a key element of the strategic landscape framework of the city. Unfortunately the Ministers did not read their final submissions sufficiently closely and wrongly construed the Council’s landscape policies: as a result, they have had to agree to the quashing of the decision in the High Court.

It appears likely that there will be yet another inquiry into these proposals given the changes in circumstances; not least of which is that Cadw has recently listed the structure of the reservoir as a Grade II listed building and therefore listed building consent would now be required to implement the proposals.

Click here for an article covering the inquiry in Planning Magazine

10.09.2009

Development Corporation defeats Mega Church's Olympic relocation bid on appeal
Thursday, September 10, 2009

Mary Cook, assisted by Asitha Ranatunga recently received the Secretary of State’s DL dismissing an appeal in which they appeared at a planning inquiry, instructed by Nigel Hewitson of Norton Rose LLP to act for the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation resisting an appeal by Kingsway International Christian Centre and the London Development Agency against the decision of the Corporation to refuse full planning permission for a phased mixed use development comprising an 8000 seat multi-use auditorium, office, multi-use building, chapel and multi-storey car park, access and landscaping at land at Beam Reach 5, Rainham. The Secretary of State recovered the appeal which concerned proposals on land designated as an Strategic Industrial Location in Havering, following relocation from Hackney to make way for the London 2012 Olympics.

The Corporation’s evidence successfully demonstrated that the development would materially harm the employment objectives of the development plan, contravened PGG 13 objectives and policies seeking to locate community facilities where they are accessible to the communities they serve. The SoS accepted the need for an auditorium large enough for KICC’s growing congregation to worship but considered other elements of the proposals could be disaggregated and accepted that similar benefits could be provided on other sites by creating facilities in locations more accessible to the main communities they serve and less suitable for employment. Over all the benefits did not outweigh the conflict with the development plan.

09.09.2009

Legal 500 2009
Wednesday, September 09, 2009

The 22nd edition of the Legal 500 has just been launched. We are delighted that the range and quality of the work we have been doing over the last year has been recognised: we have more members mentioned in the various categories where we work and have added a ranking in Property Litigation too. The rankings continue to demonstrate our expertise across our areas of practice in Chambers. We expect to see our new silks, Steven Gasztowicz, Philip Kolvin and Simon Bird, back in the rankings next year.

Category:

1. Leading Civil Common Law Sets
   Chambers
2. Administrative and Public Law
   Chambers
   Leading Silk; Mark Lowe QC, James Findlay QC, David Matthias QC
   Leading Juniors; Ranjit Bhose, Jon Holbrook, Bryan McGuire, Catherine Rowlands, Wayne Beglan, Damien Welfare
3. Consumer
   Chambers
   Leading Silk; Anthony Scrivener QC
   Leading Juniors; Gerard Forlin, Geoffrey Stephenson, Peter Miller
4. Environment
   Chambers
   Leading Silk; Mark Lowe QC, James Findlay QC
   Leading Junior; Harriet Townsend
5. Health and Safety
   Chambers
   Leading Silk; Anthony Scrivener QC
   Leading Junior; Gerard Forlin
6. Licensing
   Chambers
   Leading Silk; James Findlay QC
   Leading Juniors; Karl Davies, Ranjit Bhose, Asitha Ranatunga
7. Planning
   Chambers
   Leading Silks; Mark Lowe QC, Anthony Dinkin QC, Morag Ellis QC, James Findlay QC, Anthony Porten QC, Stephen Sauvain QC
   Leading Juniors; Mary Cook, Michael Druce, Robin Green, Richard Ground, Melissa Murphy, Adrian Trevelyan Thomas, Ian Albutt, Michael Bedford, Johanna Boyd, Josef Cannon, Jonathan Clay, Thomas Cosgrove, Nicholas Nardecchia, Paul Shadarevian and Graham Stoker
8. Property Litigation (including agriculture and housing)
   Leading Junior: Kelvin Rutledge

07.09.2009

Planning and Local Government issues for Wales
Monday, September 07, 2009

Chambers was proud to host this essential guide to the latest Planning and Local Government legislative and policy issues affecting Local Authorities at Cardiff City Hall.

Morag Ellis QC chaired the event speakers from chambers covering:

• Habitats Directive – when this bites
  Anthony Porten QC (Click here to view his slides from the event)
• Village Greens – practical advice
  Morag Ellis QC and Rob Williams (Click here to view their slides from the event)
• Local Development Plans
  Robin Green (Click here to view his slides from the event)
• S106 agreements and viability
  Michael Bedford (Click here to view his slides from the event)
• Planning law case update
  Clare Parry (Click here to view her slides from the event)
• Age assessments – recent case law and practical implications
  Bryan McGuire (Click here to view his slides from the event)
• Procurement issues for local authorities
  James Findlay QC (Click here to view his slides from the event)
• Services to children and to those leaving care
  Catherine Rowlands (Click here to view her slides from the event)

05.09.2009

Lap Dancing: 3 foot rule upheld
Saturday, September 05, 2009

A Magistrates Court sitting in Cornwall has upheld a licence condition requiring a lap-dancing club to maintain a separation of 3 feet between performers and customers. In doing so it rejected the argument of the licensee that such conditions were defunct, unenforceable, and an illegal censorship of performance.

In 2008, Newquay residents and campaigners Tracey Earnshaw and Susan Death applied for a review of a licence held by Divas Gentlemen’s Club, complaining that it was trading on an old pub licence without any conditions relating to the adult nature of the entertainment. At the review hearing, a number of management conditions were imposed by consent, but Restormel Borough Council’s licensing sub-committee went further, imposing the 3 foot condition, which the club appealed.

At the hearing of the appeal, the club maintained that its dancers were safe due to the levels of security in the club, and that there was no evidence that the club was causing problems of crime and disorder outside the club. It did, however, offer to alter the club’s trading policy of full nude, full contact lap-dancing to a policy of no contact. It stated that to go further and impose a 3 foot rule was not only unnecessary to promote the licensing objectives but contrary to the clear advice of the Association of Chief Police Officers.

The Council – now the unitary Cornwall Council – called Newquay’s Police Inspector, who gave evidence that the club was sited in the centre of the town’s party zone and that there were many vulnerable young women in the vicinity. He was concerned that the sexual charge experienced by the club’s customers together with the fact that they had been drinking posed a risk to females in the vicinity. Although there was no evidence that any Divas customers had committed sexual assaults, he maintained that his role, and the role of the Justices under the Licensing Act, was preventive. He gave evidence that to create a small buffer zone was to take some of the sexual heat out of the situation and so improve the protection for other users of the public realm.

The Council also argued that the imposition of a 3 foot rule was a modest response which did no more than bring the club into line with the 4 other lap dancing licences in Newquay. The club argued that this was to impose an impermissible standardised condition.

The Justices held that they had “a duty to consider the environmental context and locality of the area in which lap dancing venues exist and the commonality of their purpose in providing entertainment to a very similar group of clientele”, and that therefore the authority was correct to apply a common approach.

They also decided that the imposition of the condition would have the effect of giving dancers greater protection from the customers, and that the public safety objective was “best met by the imposition of a clearly stated safety zone between dancer and performer.”

As to the Appellant’s complaint that the condition would be unenforceable, the Justices stated that they did “not accept that it is not possible to set up a system of control which adequately monitors a 3 foot rule” and rejected as “fanciful” a contention that this would be harder to enforce than a no contact rule.

Finally, the Justices stated that they accepted that the club was well managed, but were “very concerned about the consequential effects and impact upon the immediate vicinity outside Divas and indeed the wider environment of Newquay, of intoxicated and highly sexually charged males leaving the premises.” They found a “serious risk of public disorder and public safety which needs to be addressed in a proactive manner”, finding a condition creating a physical space between dancers performing explicit dance routines and patrons … a sensible approach to securing” the crime prevention objective.

The Justices awarded the Council its costs of £14,000.

The Council was represented by Philip Kolvin QC.

The club was represented by Julian Skeens of Jeffrey Green & Russell.

11.08.2009

Bar Awards 2009 nominations
Tuesday, August 11, 2009

We are delighted to announce that we have been nominated for Client Service set of the year in the forthcoming Chambers Bar Awards 2009.

The nominees in this category are:

• 1 Chancery Lane
• 1 Crown Office Row
• 2-3 Gray’s Inn Square
• Henderson Chambers
• Searle Court

Click here for a complete list of 2009 nominations

The awards will be held at The Grosvenor House Hotel, Park Lane, on Thursday, 1st October 2009.

10.08.2009

Settlements bar raiser
Monday, August 10, 2009

Following his recent appointment to silk, Simon Bird QC is the focus of a recent article published in Planning Magazine. The article investigates Simon’s rise at the bar from University to his current well established planning practice. It also considers his views on the development, policy considerations and viability of major infrastructure projects over the next 20 years together with doubts over the future of the community infrastructure levy (CIL) with the greater risks faced by developers.

Click here for the full text of the article as it originally appeared in Planning Magazine

20.07.2009

The Homeless at home and women's refuges
Monday, July 20, 2009

Ruling of the House of Lords in Birmingham City Council v Ali et al, Manchester City Council v Moran

If a person has accommodation that would not be reasonable for them to continue to occupy indefinitely, whether that be overcrowded accommodation, accommodation which is in disrepair, or a refuge or shelter, the local housing authority may find that that person is homeless, whilst at the same time leaving them in that same accommodation pending permanent discharge of their duties.

In the Birmingham case, more commonly known hereto as “Aweys”, the Council had accepted six large families as homeless. In most cases the accommodation the families occupied was overcrowded. One family had a disabled child who needed adapted accommodation. One applicant complained that the privately-rented accommodation she occupied was in such disrepair that she could no longer live there. In each case the applicants remained in their existing accommodation for a significant period of time.

The Birmingham Claimants succeeded in obtaining declarations from Collins J that the Council was in breach of its duties to them because “For the homeless at home, their existing accommodation can never be regarded as suitable, even for a short time, since they are only homeless if it is not reasonable to expect them to continue to live there.” In other words, as soon as accommodation is seen as unsuitable for indefinite occupation, it is unsuitable for even one more night.

Birmingham appealed, contending that the corollary to that argument was that an applicant is only homeless if they cannot remain in their current accommodation for one more night – a Draconian hurdle to overcome.

The Court of Appeal upheld this ruling. Birmingham City Council appealed to the Lords who heard argument in January of this year.

It became apparent that the Moran case raised similar issues and judgment in the Birmingham case was postponed until after the hearing of that appeal, with Birmingham City Council given permission to make further submissions in light of the arguments in that case.

In Manchester v Moran, the applicant was housed in a refuge following domestic violence. She was aggressive and unruly in the refuge and was asked to leave. The Council held that she was intentionally homeless. She appealed unsuccessfully against this decision. The Court of Appeal held that accommodation in a refuge could be seen as accommodation which it was reasonable for a woman to continue to occupy, having regard to a number of factors including the period for which she was likely to be there, the available facilities and so on, and that the judgment of Hodgson J. in R v. London Borough of Ealing Ex p. Sidhu (1982) 2 HLR 48 was incorrect.

The arguments before the House of Lords centred on the issue of whether a shelter could be considered as “accommodation” at all, or whether it fell below the minimum level of accommodation which could properly be so described. However, when putting the two cases together, the Lords were able to find a different route to the answer.

Birmingham had argued that a local housing authority’s duty can be discharged in stages. If a person applies as homeless, they can be provided with accommodation in the first instance which is temporary and which is of a lower standard of suitability than permanent accommodation: this was clear from R v LB Brent ex parte Awua [1996] 1 AC 55 at 58A-C, where Lord Hoffmann said:

“…there is nothing in the Act to say that a local authority cannot take the view that a person can reasonably be expected to continue to occupy accommodation which is temporary…the extent to which accommodation is physically suitable, so that it would be reasonable for a person to continue to occupy it, must be related to the time for which he has been there, and is expected to stay.”

Once it was realised that a person is not homeless only if she can show that she cannot remain at her accommodation for once more night, the problem was easily solved. A woman who is in a refuge and has no hope of other accommodation unless the local housing authority steps in to assist her is homeless, as she does not have accommodation that it would be reasonable for her to continue to occupy. However, the local housing authority can leave her there pending an offer of suitable permanent accommodation – the refuge is probably the best place for her in the mean time. Similarly, in the Birmingham case, the Council was entitled to require the applicants to remain “homeless at home” in the accommodation which they currently occupied as, even though it would not be suitable for them indefinitely, it could be seen as suitable for the interim period as staging post accommodation.

Baroness Hale and Lord Neuberger in a joint Opinion said

“accommodation which may be unreasonable for a person to occupy for a long period may be reasonable for him to occupy for a short period. Accordingly, there will be cases where an applicant occupies accommodation which (a) it would not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy on a relatively long term basis, which he would have to do if the authority did not accept him as homeless, but (b) it would not be unreasonable to expect him to continue to occupy for a short period while the authority investigate his application and rights, and even thereafter while they look for accommodation to satisfy their continuing section 193 duty.”

“in our view it is proper for a local authority to decide that it would not be reasonable for a person to continue to occupy the accommodation which is available to him or her, even if it is reasonable for that person to occupy it for a little while longer, if it would not be reasonable for the person to continue to occupy the accommodation for as long as he or she will have to do so unless the authority take action.”

“This does not mean that Birmingham were entitled to leave these families where they were indefinitely. Obviously, there would come a point where they could not continue to occupy for another night and the council would have to act immediately. But there is more to it than that. It does not follow that, because that point has not yet been reached, the accommodation is “suitable” for the family within the meaning of section 206(1). There are degrees of suitability. What is suitable for occupation in
the short term may not be suitable for occupation in the medium term, and what is suitable for occupation in the medium term may not be suitable for occupation in the longer term... There was bound to come a time when their accommodation could no longer be described as “suitable” in the discharge of the duty under section 193(2).”

They then considered the approach to be adopted by a court, when considering the question whether a local housing authority have left an applicant who occupies “accommodation which it would [not] be reasonable for him to continue to occupy” in that accommodation for too long a period.

“The question is of course primarily one for the authority, and a court should normally be slow to accept that the authority have left an applicant in his unsatisfactory accommodation too long. In a place such as Birmingham, there are many families in unsatisfactory accommodation, severe constraints on budgets and personnel, and a very limited number of satisfactory properties for large families and those with disabilities. It would be wrong to ignore those pressures when deciding whether, in a particular case, an authority had left an applicant in her present accommodation for an unacceptably long period. Nonetheless, there will be cases where the court ought to step in and require an authority to offer alternative accommodation, or at least to declare that they are in breach of their duty so long as they fail to do so. While one must take into account the practical realities of the situation in which authorities find themselves, one cannot overlook the fact that Parliament has imposed on them clear duties to the homeless, including those occupying unsuitable accommodation. In some cases, the situation of a particular applicant in her present accommodation may be so bad, or her occupation may have continued for so long, that the court will conclude that enough is enough.”

Birmingham City Council’s appeal against Collins J’s finding that their allocations policy was unlawful was dismissed, but for different reasons.

Catherine Rowlands (led by Ashley Underwood QC) appeared for Birmingham City Council.

A transcript of the judgment is found here

17.07.2009

Licensing Authorities: Landmark Ruling
Friday, July 17, 2009

R (Harpers Leisure International Limited and Michel Harper) v Chief Constable of Surrey and Guildford Borough Council (Administrative Court, 13th July 2009)

Harpers Leisure International Limited and Mr. Harper were represented by Kevin de Haan QC.

Guildford Borough Council was represented by Philip Kolvin QC.

In an important Administrative Court judgment (13th July 2009), Mr. Justice Charles has ruled that Licensing Authorities have no power to stay or dismiss applications for review as an abuse of process.

The judgment came at the end of a challenge to Guildford Borough Council by Michel Harper, the owner of the Drink/Voodoo Lounge in Onslow Street, Guildford. In September 2008, the Chief Officer of Guildford Police had commenced a review of the premises licence for the bar, based on allegations of violence by door staff on customers. At the review hearing before Guildford Borough Council’s Licensing Sub-Committee Mr. Harper argued that the review ought to be stayed as an abuse of process. He alleged that the police had failed to discuss alternatives to review, in breach of an enforcement protocol to which the Police were allegedly a party, together with Service Level Agreements and the Enforcement Concordat. He also argued that the police had given him a legitimate expectation of such negotiations. The Licensing Sub-Committee ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider abuse of process arguments, and also refused an adjournment to permit its ruling to be judicially reviewed. It proceeded to determine the merits of the review, deciding to remove Mr. Harper as the designated premises supervisor, and ordering an upgrade of the CCTV provision.

Mr. Harper sought permission to judicially review the police decision to bring the application for review, together with the merits decision made by the Licensing Sub-Committee and its jurisdictional ruling. He obtained leave to proceed only with the last of these – a challenge to the Council - whereupon the police dropped out of the proceedings which were therefore defended by the Council alone.

Mr. Harper argued that the right of fairness enshrined in common law and in Article 6 of the European Convention demanded that there be a general right in administrative tribunals to stay proceedings for an abuse of process, unless excluded by the specific words of the statute. If a specific right was needed, it was found in section 9(3) of the Licensing Act 2003, which permits licensing authorities to control their own procedure.

The Learned Judge, however, preferred the argument of Guildford Borough Council that there was no inherent power in administrative tribunals to stay proceedings for abuse of process, and that if such a power was to be implied, it would have to be as a result of a process of statutory construction. Relying on cases principally from the field of immigration, the Council argued successfully for a series of tests to be applied in order to ascertain whether a power was to be implied, including whether the statutory language justified such implication, whether the statutory language led to the conclusion that the power must be implied in order to enable the authority to carry out its functions, whether the intention of Parliament would be defeated if the power were not implied, whether a general abuse power would be inconsistent with the express language of the Act, whether the integrity of the regime was sufficiently protected by other powers, and whether the power could be implied without difficulty.

As to the language of the Act, the Learned Judge accepted Guildford Borough Council’s argument that the licensing authority was given specific power in section 51 of the Act to dismiss review applications by all parties on the grounds of irrelevance to the licensing objectives, and by interested parties on the grounds that they are frivolous, vexatious or repetitious. This was a powerful indication that Parliament did not intend a wider abuse-type jurisdiction. Section 9(3) of the Act was intended to permit a licensing authority to control its own procedure, not to bring the entire proceedings to a halt.

The Learned Judge further held that while there is an adversarial aspect to the Act, there was also an investigatory element as demonstrated by Regulation 23 of the Hearings Regulations, which provides for the hearing to take the form of a discussion. He held that it would defeat the intention and policy of the Act for informal proceedings to be waylaid by an essentially collateral attack, and that Parliament had not intended local councillors to become involved in such arguments.

Finally, if it could genuinely be said that a statutory agency had abused its own powers by starting a review application, the remedy was to apply for judicial review, with all the safeguards which such procedures entail, rather than expecting local councillors to exercise essentially public law powers. The general requirement of fairness, which was undoubted, was amply satisfied both by this right and the procedural powers expressly placed in the hands of licensing authorities.

The judgment is of obvious importance both within and outside the field of licensing, because it establishes the principles upon which it will be decided whether administrative tribunals are to exercise abuse-type powers in future cases. For licensing authorities, it gives further assurance to sub-committees that their function is to determine the merits having regard to the licensing objectives, and not to become distracted by collateral arguments.

The decision of the Council on the merits will now proceed to an appeal in Guildford Magistrates Court in September 2009.

21.06.2009

Primacy to be given to section 20 of the Children Act 1989
Sunday, June 21, 2009

Appeal allowed in the House of Lords in G v Southwark LBC

If a child of 16 or 17 who has been thrown out of the family home presents himself to a local children’s services authority and asks to be accommodated by them under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, is it open to that authority instead to arrange for him to be accommodated by the local housing authority under the homelessness provisions of Part VII of the Housing Act 1996?

The clear answer of the House of Lords to this important question, given when allowing G’s appeal against Southwark, was no. If the requirements of section 20 Children Act are met, then a service must be provided by Children Services under section 20 of the Children Act. Moreover in reaching that conclusion the House of Lords gave clear guidance as to the primacy of the obligations owed under section 20 when considered together with section 17 and with duties owed under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996.

The following points are important to note:

1. The issue was one of construction of section 20.
   What do the criteria in section 20(1) mean and how, if at all, is their application affected by the other duties of children’s authorities, in particular under section 17 of the 1989 Act, and by the duties of housing authorities under the 1996 Act? (Baroness Hale at paragraph 7)
2. The question was whether the requirements of section 20 were met.
   The Appellant’s case was that they were all met. He was a child. He was in need. He was in their area. He was homeless so he required accommodation. He required it for one of the reasons set out in sub paragraphs (a) to (c). All the other requirements of section 20 were met.
3. If they were met, no service could be provided under section 17; nor could it be provided under the homelessness legislation.
   In my view, therefore, the Barnet case is, if anything, helpful to A, in highlighting the primacy of the specific duty owed to individuals in section 20 over the general duty owed to children in need and their families and its associated powers in section 17, just as the Hammersmith and Fulham case is helpful to A in highlighting the primacy of the Children Act over the Housing Act in providing for children in need. (Baroness Hale, paragraph 25)
4. The Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 (SI 2002/2051) consistent with that approach.
   The 2002 Order takes out of priority need those children who require accommodation in the circumstances set out in section 20(1). They cannot in the same breath be put back into priority need by adjudging that they do not require accommodation at all when clearly they
   do. (Baroness Hale at paragraph 26)
5. To read the Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 (SI 2002/2051) as providing a more general obligation to accommodate 16 and 17 year olds under the homelessness legislation involves either circular reasoning, or impermissibly reading words into section 20.
   The only way to break out of that circle (recognised by Anthony Edward-Stuart QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge in R (A) v Coventry City Council [2009] EWHC 34 (Admin)) is to read into section 20(1) the words “under this section” after “requires accommodation". Put another way, the question would then become, not “does this child require accommodation for one of the listed reasons?” but “does this child require to become a ‘looked after’ child with all that that entails?” There are at least two problems with this.
   First and foremost, it involves reading into the section words which are not there. Second, Parliament has decided the circumstances in which the duty to accommodate arises and then decided what that duty involves. It is not for the local authority to decide that, because they do not like what the duty to accommodate involves or do not think it appropriate, they do not
   have to accommodate at all. (Baroness Hale at paragraph 27)
6. Most homeless 16 and 17 year olds are in need.
   Is the applicant a child in need? This will often require careful assessment. In this case it is common ground that A is a child in need, essentially because he is homeless. It is, perhaps, possible to envisage circumstances in which a 16 or 17 year old who is temporarily without accommodation is nevertheless not in need within the meaning of section 17(10): perhaps a child whose home has been temporarily damaged by fire or flood who can well afford hotel accommodation while it is repaired. (Baroness Hale at paragraph 28 (2)).
7. Homeless children require accommodation.
   In this case it is quite obvious that a sofa surfing child requires accommodation. But there may be cases where the child does have a home to go to, whether on his own or with family or friends, but needs help in getting there, or getting into it, or in having it made habitable or safe. This is the line between needing “help with accommodation” (not in itself a technical term) and needing “accommodation". (Baroness Hale at paragraph 28(4))
8. Caution should be exercised in reading LAC (2003) 13.
   ...Circular suggests that, even though the section 20(1) criteria are met, the authority have a choice between section 17 and section 20 which is based upon whether the child needs to be “looked after", it is incorrect. Section 20 involves an evaluative judgment on some matters but not a discretion. (Baroness Hale at paragraph 31).
9. Caution should be shown before ceasing a section 20 service.
   The whole purpose of the leaving care provisions was to ensure that older children who were without family support were given just the sort of help with moving into independent living that children normally expect from their families. Authorities should therefore be slow to conclude that a child was no longer “in need” because he did not need that help or because it could be provided in other ways. (Baroness Hale at paragraph 32).
10. Cooperation and passing the buck are not the same thing.
    This does not mean that the children’s authority can avoid their responsibilities by “passing the buck” to another authority; rather that they can ask another authority to use its powers to help them discharge theirs. They can ask a housing authority, for example, to make a certain amount of suitable accommodation available for them to use in discharging their responsibility to accommodate children under section 20. Section 23(2) gives them great flexibility in the ways in which they can provide accommodation for the children they are looking after, ranging from placing them with families, relatives or other suitable people, placing them in an appropriate children’s home, or “making such other arrangements as . . . seem appropriate to them". The very flexibility of what the children’s authority can provide supports the construction which we have placed upon section 20(1). (Baroness Hale at paragraph 33)
11. The Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 (SI 2002/2051) does not transfer responsibility to accommodate 16 and 17 year olds from Children’s Services to the Homelessness section.The Homelessness (Priority Need for Accommodation) (England) Order 2002 (SI 2002/2051) was introduced for a limited purpose.
    Until the Order came into force, a child aged 16 or 17 would not have been treated as being in priority need under Part VII of the 1996 Act unless he or she was “vulnerable as a result of … [some] other special reason” - see section 189(1)(c). If a child of that age fell within section 20 of the 1989 Act, he or she would be provided with accommodation. However, if such a child did not fall within section 20, no accommodation would be provided, unless he or she was found to be“vulnerable” - and even then there might have been an argument that being aged 16 or 17 was not a “special reason". The purpose of the 2002 Order was, as I see it, to fill that lacuna, not to enable a children’s authority to divert its duty under section 20 to the housing authority, thereby emasculating the assistance to be afforded to children of 16 or 17 who “require accommodation". (Lord Neuberger at paragraph 40).

Bryan McGuire and Peggy Etiebet appeared for Southwark

A transcript of the judgment is found here

16.06.2009

Regionalisation of the Administrative Court
Tuesday, June 16, 2009

2-3 Gray’s Inn Square Counsel instructed in the first case in Birmingham

Regionalisation of the Administrative Court has arrived. Practitioners should please note the following:

1. Administrative Court Offices have been established in the Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and Cardiff District Registries
2. A key aim of this initiative is facilitate access to justice by enabling cases to be administered and determined in the most appropriate location. To achieve this purpose the new Practice Direction (Practice Direction 54D – Administrative Court (Venue)) provides flexibility in relation to where claims are to be administered and enables claims to be transferred to different venues.
3. Claims issued in or transferred to those District Registries will not necessarily be heard in those cities: Birmingham District Registry cases will normally be determined at a court in the Midland region (geographically covering the area of the Midland Circuit); in Cardiff in Wales; in Leeds in the North-Eastern Region (geographically covering the area of the North Eastern Circuit); in London at the Royal Courts of Justice; and in Manchester, in the North-Western Region (geographically covering the Northern Circuit).
4. Some claims will not go to the regional centres: proceedings relating to control orders (within the meaning of Part 76); financial restrictions proceedings; proceedings relating to terrorism or alleged terrorists (where that is a relevant feature of the claim); proceedings in which a special advocate is or is to be instructed; proceedings to which RSC Order 115 applies; proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; appeals to the Administrative Court under the Extradition Act 2003; proceedings which must be heard by a Divisional Court; and proceedings relating to the discipline of solicitors.
5. Urgent out of hours telephone applications for interim relief should still, for the time being, be made to London in the usual way but office hours applications should now be made to the relevant Administrative Court Office.
6. The general expectation is that proceedings will be administered and determined in the region with which the claimant has the closest connection, subject to the following considerations as applicable –
   (1) any reason expressed by any party for preferring a particular venue;
   (2) the region in which the defendant, or any relevant office or department of the defendant, is based;
   (3) the region in which the claimant’s legal representatives are based;
   (4) the ease and cost of travel to a hearing;
   (5) the availability and suitability of alternative means of attending a hearing (for example, by video link);
   (6) the extent and nature of media interest in the proceedings in any particular locality;
   (7) the time within which it is appropriate for the proceedings to be determined;
   (8) whether it is desirable to administer or determine the claim in another region in the light of the volume of claims issued at, and the capacity, resources and workload of, the court at which it is issued;
   (9) whether the claim raises issues sufficiently similar to those in another outstanding claim to make it desirable that it should be determined together with, or immediately following, that other claim; and
   (10) whether the claim raises devolution issues and for that reason whether it should more appropriately be determined in London or Cardiff.
7. The court may on an application by a party or of its own initiative direct that the claim be determined in a region other than that of the venue in which the claim is currently assigned.

Sophie Weller of these chambers was instructed in the first Administrative Court case to be heard in Birmingham. She was instructed by Nottingham solicitors Bhatia Best in a community care case raising assessment issues against Nottingham CC. Other members of chambers have appeared in Birmingham during the course of its first month of operation, for Coventry CC and Birmingham CC, and on both interim and final hearings.

Bryan McGuire was invited to appear on the Discussion Panel at the Judicial Review North conference held in Manchester on 5th June 2009. He appeared together with HHJ Gilbart QC (who hears Administrative Law cases in Manchester and was a leading advocate of regional centres) , Frances Patterson QC (the well known Manchester planning Silk), and Denise Dolan of the Ministry of Justice. The issue for discussion was the likely impact of regionalisation of Administrative Court work on solicitors and on respondent authorities. The following emerged during the course of discussion.
a) At the moment, the 10 defendant local authorities in receipt of most Judicial Review Claims are all in the Greater London region. This was believed to be partly attributable to a “cluster effect”. It was widely thought that regionalisation will lead to more local solicitors taking more public law points in local courts. Local authorities across the country should prepare themselves for a greater number of challenges.
b) It is hoped that pressure on, and delays in, the Administrative Court in London will be reduced.
c) The view of the Manchester barristers and judges present was that regional non- urgent claims are being placed before a Judge, considered and listed more quickly than is sometimes the case in London. This remains so despite the determined efforts to reduce the backlog in London.
d) The early signs are promising. Manchester in particular is off to a flying start, but all 4 centres have been reasonably busy.
e) The range of claims issued in Manchester and now coming before the court is broad.

Click here for the full text of PRACTICE DIRECTION 54D – ADMINISTRATIVE COURT (VENUE)

09.06.2009

Local Authorities Win Age Assessment Litigation
Tuesday, June 09, 2009

R(A) v Croydon LBC & R(WK) v SSHD & Kent CC [2009] EWHC 939 (Admin)

What role if any should paediatric evidence of the sort produced by Dr Michie and/or Dr Birch have in the process of assessing whether a person is a child? Is the local authority trumped whenever confronted with one of their reports? Must it accept the conclusion of the paediatrician? Can it only disagree if it obtains an “expert” of its own? Or can it simply disagree with the conclusion if it thinks the paediatrician is wrong? These questions, which have bedevilled local authorities over recent years and have caused them unimaginable concern and expense, have been answered fully and emphatically in their favour by Collins J in the Croydon and Kent lead cases.

The background is familiar. Local authorities seek to follow the guidance provided in B v Merton: “the determination of the age of the applicant will depend on the history he gives, on his physical appearance and on his behaviour... the determination of the applicant’s age is rendered difficult by the absence of any reliable anthropometric test: for someone who is close to the age of 18, there is no reliable medical or other scientific test to determine whether he is or was over the age of 18”. Expert evidence was thin on the ground and of little use in any event. “To obtain any reliable medical option, one has to go to one of the few paediatricians who have experience in this area. Even they can be of limited help...”

To disagree with a paediatrician without consulting its own expert has been to invite a perversity challenge. Local authorities have found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. Should they incur the sometimes considerable costs of engaging their own expert? If so, what type of expert should they use, from what discipline? Or should they contend that there is no such thing as a medical expert on age assessment? By the time the matter came before the Administrative Court in march this year there were 76 issued cases in the High Court all taking essentially the same points and waiting on the result.

The key points in the judgment were:

1. The decision on age is one for the local authority’s age assessors.
   The evidence from Croydon and Kent and … Cambridgeshire show that … those responsible can be trusted to carry out their tasks properly so that the authorities and the Home Office can rely on their conclusions. (21)
2. Their decision can only be challenged on usual Judicial Review grounds.
   The social workers involved in the decision making process who are employed by the local authorities in these cases have had training and do have substantial experience in assessing the age of UASCs. … That does not of course mean that their decisions are not challengeable, but it does mean that the court should not readily take the view that they are flawed. (9)
3. Paediatric reports are not trump cards.
   No paediatrician other than the very few prepared to produce reports for claimants will agree to become involved and … a medical view is not likely to be any more reliable or helpful than that formed by a properly trained and experienced social worker. Nor is it the case that opinions obtained from Drs Michie and Birch can be regarded as reliable. (47)
   It is for them [LAs & SSHD] to decide how much weight to attach to such a report and it is in a given case open to the decision maker to attach no weight. I would expect that only in rare cases would such a report persuade the decision maker to reach a different view. (34, 45)
   Thus Kent and so the Secretary of State are entitled to attach little if any weight to reports which make assessments based to a significant degree on contradictory [to their own] findings (75)
4. The decision of Stephen Morris QC to that effect in R(A) v Croydon LBC [2008] EWHC 2921 (Admin) last December was wrong.
   Reliance on the homelessness case of Shala was wrong. That case concerned the question how a local authority should respond to medical evidence on a medical issue: on the question whether someone was vulnerable by reason of mental illness. But the assessment of age is not a medical matter.
   I do not accept that the approach adopted by Mr Morris was correct. (6)
   There is no obligation on the authority to obtain medical advice [in order to disagree with a medical report on age] (47)
5. Paediatricians are no better placed than social workers to assess age
   It is Dr Stern’s view that a paediatrician is unlikely to be able to reach a conclusion which is superior to that reached by an experienced social worker, provided, of course, that the social worker is properly trained and experienced and conducted the necessary interview in an appropriate fashion. (25)
6. The evidence of Dr Birch and Dr Michie is unreliable.
   The criticisms made by Dr Stern seem to me to be cogent (32); nor is it the case that opinions obtained from Drs Michie and Birch can be regarded as reliable (47); her observations of matters that social workers cannot observe [sexual maturity, body hair & teeth] are not a reliable basis for assessing age (32)
   The flawed approach indicated by this [attributing the slight overweight to farm work etc] is all too obvious. It assumes the correctness of the stated age and tries to marry the weight to that. (67)
   Kent’s concerns about the quality and accuracy of Dr Birch’s observations have some materiality (73); Kent are entitled to look with considerable scepticism at her findings which contradict their own. (75)
   Her reports cannot be relied on insofar as they contradict the views of properly trained experienced social workers carrying out Merton compliant assessments (80)
   Flawed though they [her reports] may be and in my judgment are, they should be considered since there is always a possibility that they may identify something which could and occasionally should lead to a different conclusion. (75)
   Dr Michie
   his reports are flawed by his failure to retain any notes of his interviews and observations (24)
   It seems that those representing claimants have realised that Dr Michie’s reports are likely now to be regarded as unimpressive (24)
   My conclusions in relation to Dr Birch, if adverse, would apply a fortiori to Dr Michie (24)
   Nor is it the case that opinions obtained from Drs Michie and Birch can be regarded as reliable. (47)
7. Local Authorities can rely upon the evidence of Dr Colin Stern in support of a contention that paediatric evidence does not take matters much further.
   I prefer the views of Dr Stern to those of Dr Birch. (33)
   Fortunately for the authorities, Dr Stern has given comprehensive evidence which can now be relied on for all cases subject, of course, to circumstances which may be particular to any such case. (47)
8. That said, they do not generally need to obtain their own report from a paediatric expert.
   Collins J agreed with Croydon’s position that a person’s age could not be determined by medical science.
9. Permission to appeal was refused, and no stay was granted in any claim other than those of A, M and WK.
   Public funding to seek permission to appeal is nonetheless being sought.
10. All other cases should now proceed.
    Collins J made an express order that all age dispute claims should progress on the law as it currently stands (i.e. applying his judgment and the Court of Appeal’s judgment in A v Croydon; M v Lambeth [2008] EWCA Civ 1445). Collins J made an order that Claimants in such cases should not be removed from the UK pending the outcome of the House of Lords appeal in A v Croydon; M v Lambeth. He also observed that a similar order or undertaking should be made in relation to the age dispute cases which have been issued.
11. Anonymity orders were not made in respect of either claimant.
12. Permission to appeal, sought by each claimant, was refused.

Jon Holbrook appeared as Junior Counsel for Kent. Bryan McGuire and Peggy Etiebet appeared as Counsel for Croydon.

Click here for full text of the judgment

30.04.2009

Planning Magazine's Legal Survey 2009
Thursday, April 30, 2009

Planning Magazine’s Legal Survey 2009 appears in the latest edition of Planning Magazine.

We are delighted that Mary Cook has again been so highly rated as the top Planning junior for the second year running.

Sixteen other members of our Planning Group are also featured in the survey.

Highest rated planning silks
Morag Ellis who is commended as the “best of the past five years’ planning silk appointments.”
Mark Lowe
Simon Bird
Stephen Sauvain
Vincent Fraser
Anthony Porten
James Findlay

Highest rated planning juniors
Mary Cook
Richard Ground
Tom Cosgrove
Michael Bedford
Paul Shadarevian
Melissa Murphy
Harriet Townsend

Highest rated planning juniors under 35
Melissa Murphy
Johanna Boyd
Asitha Ranatunga
Clare Parry

Click here to read the full report

16.04.2009

Silks ceremony
Thursday, April 16, 2009

Chambers celebrated the appointment of Steven Gasztowicz , Philip Kolvin and Simon Bird as Queen’s Counsel in the formal ceremony at Westminster Hall.

Click here for a photo of Philip Kolvin, Steven Gasztowicz and Simon Bird in ceremonial dress on the day.

Click here for another photo showing the newly appointed silks with their clerks. From left to right; Martin Hart, Philip Kolvin, Frances Kaliszewska, Steven Gasztowicz, Stuart Pullum and Simon Bird.

02.04.2009

Proposed Permit Scheme for Road and Street Works
Thursday, April 02, 2009

Celina Colquhoun is advising a number of London highway authorities on the drafting and submission of a Permit Scheme for Road and Street Works under the Traffic Management Act 2004 for approval by the Secretary of State for Transport. The London Permit Scheme or LoPS when it is approved will replace the current Noticing System under the National Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (as amended).This follows the recent enactment of the Traffic Management Permit Schemes (England) Regulations 2007.

The LoPS is out for consultation until June 2009 and after the responses have been considered, the Permit Scheme will be put into its final form for submission to the Secretary of State for his consideration. The Secretary State may then approve the scheme with or without modifications and it will be given effect by a statutory Order.
The proposals will affect all road and street works promoters, in particular utility companies.

Click here for the full article released by Transport for London

30.03.2009

Cracking down on disruption: Premises closure orders
Monday, March 30, 2009

Rutledge and Bhogal, Cracking down on disruption SJ 153/7 (24 February 2009)

Kelvin Rutledge and Kuljit Bhogal recently wrote an article, published in the Solicitors Journal, covering the new powers for local authorities to temporarily close premises associated with anti-social behaviour.

The new provisions, introduced by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, came into force on 1 December 2008 and their article covers:

• Making an application
• Serving a closure notice
• Defining anti-social behaviour
• Granting a closure order
• Reasonable grounds
• Serving evidence
• Last resort
• Information for defendants
• Concerns for the future

Click here for a copy of the article

Click here for a for the full text of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008

19.03.2009

Civic Trust Awards 50th Anniversary
Thursday, March 19, 2009

2-3 Gray’s Inn Square was proud to host the drinks reception at the 50th Civic Trust Awards ceremony on the 18th March 2009 at the Emirates Stadium in London. The awards recognise and celebrate the best in architecture, townscape, planning, and infrastructure. Award winners make a positive contribution to the places in which we all live, work, learn and relax.

The awards were presented by the Civic Trust's President, Griff Rhys Jones. In his speech he challenged us all as individuals to care about our public spaces and local communities – what they look like and how they function. Chairman of the Civic Trust, and member of these chambers, Philip Kolvin QC, gave the keynote speech.

Click here for the Civic Trust’s press release

Click here for the Civic Trust’s website dedicated to the Awards

Click here for a PDF copy of the Civic Trust Award Winners 2009 brochure

19.02.2009

New Silks 2009
Thursday, February 19, 2009

Chambers is proud to announce that  Steven Gasztowicz , Philip Kolvin and Simon Bird have been notified of their appointment as Queen’s Counsel and will take up their roles on 30 March after the formal ceremony in Westminster Hall.

13.02.2009

NO SHORT CUT - Liverpool City Council v Hillingdon LBC
Friday, February 13, 2009

This case was heard in the Court of Appeal on 10 February 2009.

The judgement was that a social services department cannot simply ascertain a child’s wish to be in the area of another local authority and deliver him there. To do so is ineffective to discharge its assessment duty owed under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. Ascertaining wishes and feelings under section 20 (6) of the Children Act 1989 is only a part of, and not a substitute for, a section 20 assessment. On the facts of this case the responsibility remained with the first authority only, Hillingdon. These conclusions were reached by the Court of Appeal in Liverpool CC v Hillingdon LBC [2009] EWCA CIV 43 (10th February 2009, Rix, Dyson and Wilson LJJ)

Bryan McGuire and Peggy Etiebet acted for Liverpool City Council

For a fuller report on the case, click here.

03.02.2009

The procurement process and freedom of information
Tuesday, February 03, 2009

2-3 Gray’s Inn Square was proud to organise this extremely successful seminar with Trowers & Hamlins held at their London office, Sceptre Court on Thursday 29 January 2009.

The seminar covered the following:

• Overview of existing regulatory framework
• Impact of this on your bid documentation
• Practical issues after bidding
• Issues after contract
• Protecting your information

James Findlay QC and Damien Welfare spoke at this seminar and their complete slides from the day can be found here.

28.01.2009

Civic Trust Awards 50th Anniversary Ceremony
Wednesday, January 28, 2009

2-3 Gray’s Inn Square is delighted to be able to sponsor part of the festivities to celebrate the Civic Trust’s 50th Anniversary.

The Civic Trust is celebrating fifty years of achievement through the Civic Trust Awards; promoting architecture, townscape, planning and infrastructure which have made a positive difference to the places in which we all live, work, learn and relax.

The 2009 Awards Ceremony and Gala Dinner will see the announcement of the 2009 winners, celebrate the milestone 50th anniversary, and look forward to the next fifty years of the Civic Trust Awards.

The black tie event will take place on 18 March 2009 at the Emirates Stadium, London. The event will be hosted by the Civic Trust's President, Griff Rhys Jones. Sir Terry Farrell, one of the world's foremost architects and urban designers, will be giving the keynote speech. 2-3 Gray’s Inn Square will be hosting the pre-dinner Drinks Reception.

For further details, please see

http://www.civictrustawards.org.uk/news/news-stories/book-tickets-for-the-civic-trust-awards-50th-anniversary-ceremony

15.01.2009

Planning Issues Seminar
Thursday, January 15, 2009

Chambers was proud to host this successful afternoon of talks for Local Authorities in association with Sharpe Pritchard aimed at Local Authority lawyers and heads of legal services.

James Findlay QC spoke with a number of partners and senior solicitors from Sharpe Pritchard and Robin Green and Josef Cannon hosted a question and answer session.