Too little? When intervention is not required
Public Law and Judicial Review
In the second article in this series, I have considered the issue of delay, and the Court of Appeal’s finding that BC did not bring his claim in time.
In this article, I will turn to the question of what Surrey did in response to BC’s position in 2019. The facts are summarised in my introductory article and in the judgment.
When they received a referral from Runnymede as the local housing authority in 2019, Surrey met with BC and offered him low level interventions.
BC’s case was that
(1) at 18 September 2019, he was a “child in need” within the meaning of s.17(10) of the CA89;
(2) at that date, SCC owed a duty to accommodate him under s.20 because his circumstances fell under s.20(1)(c);
(3) SCC complied with that duty by arranging for him to live with K’s mother either as the judge found from 17 October 2019 or, as contended on the cross-appeal, from 20 September 2019;
(4) he was therefore a “looked-after child” within the meaning of s.22(1)(b);
(5) he was therefore, on the judge’s finding, “a person qualifying for advice and assistance” under sections 24 and 24B or, as contended on the cross-appeal, a “former relevant child” under section 23C.
The Court recalled that “The term “early help” is defined neither in statute nor in the National Guidance, but in other statutory guidance – Working Together to Safeguard Children (2023), (“Working Together”), in particular chapter 3 at footnote 40:
“Early help is a system of support which aims to support children and families as soon as problems emerge. Some early help support is described as ‘targeted early help’ and is provided to children and families who are identified by practitioners to have multiple or complex needs requiring a specialist and/or multi-agency response but where statutory intervention is not needed.””
The Court of Appeal identified that the question for the Court was whether Surrey’s decision that BC was not a child in need in September 2019 was Wednesbury unreasonable.
They acknowledged that there were good reasons for looking carefully at that decision. There were factors that raised concerns: BC’s troubled history, his housing application stating that he had nowhere to stay that night, and his current problems of conflict with his family, and drug abuse. However, the Court noted:
the magnetic factor in this case is that the series of evaluations that arise in these circumstances – whether a young person falls into the category of a child in need and, if so, whether they require accommodation as a result of one of the factors in s.20(1) – are matters of professional social work judgment. …
Where the professional evaluation is that the young person’s needs can be met through the provision of the non-statutory early help services, as opposed to the statutory services under Part III of the CA1989, that evaluation will only be open to challenge on Wednesbury principles. The requirement for a litigant arguing that such a judgment was so unreasonable that no reasonable social worker acting reasonably could have made it is a high hurdle. We are not satisfied that the judge had this high hurdle in clear view. In that respect he erred in law, and as a result his conclusion cannot stand.
Not every child who has fallen out with their parents and is staying with a friend will be a child in need. In this case, Surrey had spoken to BC and established that he was still staying with his friend.
What BC needed was help repairing his relationship with his mother, getting into education and tackling drug use. This could be done by referral to Targeted Youth Support – and his mother agreed with that.
The conclusion that BC was not a child in need or requiring accommodation under section 20 was one they were entitled to reach.
The Court recalled that under section 17, a person is only a child in need if they are likely to suffer an impairment of health or development without the provision of services.
As described in Working Together, some young people will be “identified by practitioners to have multiple or complex needs requiring a specialist and/or multi-agency response but where statutory intervention is not needed”. The assessment of the social workers in the present case in September 2019 was that BC fell into that category. The issues identified by the TYS team on referral in September 2019 were typical of the issues for which TYS services were intended – for a child whose “needs are complex, who often have various professionals involved and require a lead professional to ensure multi-agency input and support is coordinated”.
The Court also rejected the contention that by applying as homeless to Runnymede, BC had evinced a wish to be accommodated under section 20 by Surrey. Further, as he was nearly 18, his wishes were to be given a good deal of weight.
Whilst a person who has fallen out with their parents and been excluded from the home may come within section 20(1)(c), not every young person of 17 in those circumstances will be a child in need. Surrey evaluated his case and decided that he did not need accommodation. That was a conclusion they were entitled to reach.
The Judge had wrongly substituted his own evaluation for whether BC met the criteria, and had applied too low a standard.
The third issue under this appeal did not, therefore, need to be resolved, but the Court commented on it nonetheless, and this will be addressed in the final article in this series.
Catherine Rowlands appeared for Surrey County Council.