Court of Appeal considers the interaction between intentional homelessness and mental health
City of London Corporation v Bussandra [2025] EWCA Civ 1580, judgment 5 December 2025.
Mr Bussandra had a long history of mental health issues. In 2015, he served notice to quit his tenancy of a housing association flat in Brighton. In 2020, he applied to the City of London for housing assistance. The City concluded that, while Mr Bussandra was homeless, eligible, and in priority need, he had made himself homeless intentionally by terminating his Brighton tenancy. The consequence was that he was not owed the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996.
Mr Bussandra challenged the review decision on numerous grounds, including that the reviewer had erred in finding that his service of the notice to terminate was a “deliberate” act within the meaning of section 191 of the 1996 Act. That argument was premised on Mr Bussandra’s mental state at the time the notice was served.
The county court judge quashed the review decision. He held that the review officer, in deciding whether Mr Bussandra’s termination of his tenancy was a “deliberate” act, had applied the wrong legal test. He also held that the review officer had erred in departing from the views expressed by the mental health practitioner instructed on behalf of Mr Bussandra, and that the decision did not comply with the public sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The City appealed. The Court of Appeal has allowed the appeal on all grounds.
The Court of Appeal heard opposing submissions on the interaction between intentional homelessness and mental health. Para 56 of the judgment of Newey LJ (with whom Zacaroli and Yip LJJ agreed) will be of particular interest to practitioners in this area of law:
“In all the circumstances, I have not been persuaded that, for mental illness to render an act or omission non-deliberate, the person must have lacked mental capacity. Neither, however, do I accept Ms Davies’ submission that it suffices that a mental health problem played a significant role in the relevant act or omission. Neither the case law nor the Code seems to me to lend any real support to that view and, as a matter of language, it appears to me that the fact that a mental health problem played a significant role in a decision need not mean that it was not taken ‘deliberately’. As Mr Hutchings pointed out, were Ms Davies’ contention well-founded anyone who chose not to pay rent or to hand back keys while suffering from mild depression could argue that mental health problems played a significant role and so that the decision was not deliberate. I do not think that conclusion would accord with the ‘ordinary meaning’ of ‘deliberately’, the Code or the thrust of section 191 of the 1996 Act.”
Matt Hutchings KC, Riccardo Calzavara, and Jackson Sirica were instructed by Sadhari Perera on behalf of the City of London.
