Excluded by definition: the narrow reading of “stepchild” and housing succession claims 

Public Law and Judicial Review, Housing, Local Government

On 31 July 2025, the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Abdelrahman v Islington LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1038. The appeal concerned whether, in interpreting the authority’s discretionary succession policy, the Appellant, who is the child of a deceased tenant’s partner by a former relationship, is included within the meaning of “stepchild”.  

Ms Abdelrahman’s mother was in an intimate relationship with Mr Seales (the secure tenant), but they never married or entered into a civil partnership. The Court of Appeal upheld HHJ Bloom’s first instance decision that “stepchild” meant a child of a person’s spouse or civil partner by previous marriage or civil partnership. On the basis of that interpretation, Ms Abdelrahman fell outside the scope of the policy and was not entitled to succeed. 

The Court also held that the policy did not amount to article 14, ECHR discrimination. As Lord Justice Lewison put in at paragraph 101: 

“There have been a number of cases in which it has been argued that where a person is not entitled to succeed to a tenancy their Convention rights have been infringed. None has so far succeeded. This is another such case. I would dismiss the appeal”.  

Background

The authority let the property subject to the appeal to Mr Seales on a weekly secure tenancy (as defined and regulated by the Housing Act 1985). Ms Abdelrahman is the daughter of Raksa Patel. Ms Patel retained her own property Luton. Mr Seales died on 31 March 2021.  

Following his death, Ms Abdelrahman applied to succeed under the authority’s discretionary policy on the basis that she was Mr Seales’ stepchild because her mother was in a committed relationship with Mr Seales at the time of his death. Ms Abdelrahman was not entitled to succeed under the Housing Act 1985 as the tenancy was granted after 1 April 2012. 

The authority informed Ms Abdelrahman that her application for a discretionary succession had been refused because Ms Abdelrahman’s mother was not, and had never been, married to Mr Seales. The Appellant was not, therefore, a “stepchild” under the authority’s discretionary policy. 

The authority’s discretionary succession policy provides: 

“The following relatives would no longer have an automatic right to succeed but the council may allow them to succeed if they have been living in the property for 12 months before the death of the tenant. If the grant of a discretionary tenancy would lead to under-occupation or the occupation of an adapted property that was not needed, the tenant will be required to move to a smaller property that is suitable for their housing needs. These are called discretionary tenancies. 

• Parent 

• Grandparent 

• Child 

• Grandchild 

• Sibling 

• uncle or aunt 

• nephew or niece 

• half brother or sister 

It should also be noted that recent case law has decided that a foster child is not counted as a child for the purposes of succession and that only blood relations (including step-children and illegitimate children) should be considered for succession in future. This change takes effect from 1 July 2013.”  

At trial, the substance of the dispute between the parties was whether Ms Abdelrahman was a “stepchild” for the purposes of the authority’s discretionary policy. Her Honour Judge Bloom granted the authority possession of the property. The Appellant had no lawful right to remain at the property. Nor did she have any right to be offered a tenancy by the authority at a different property because she was not eligible for either a statutory succession under the Housing Act 1985 or a discretionary succession under the authority’s discretionary policy.  

The Appeal

New arguments on appeal 

Ms Abdelrahman attempted to advance a new argument on the day of the hearing (it had not been canvassed in the grounds or the skeleton argument). In essence the argument was that since section 86A (5) of the Housing Act 1985 gave the same rights of succession to persons living together as a married couple or civil partners, the meaning of “stepchild” in section 113 of that Act should include the biological child of a person living with the deceased tenant as if they were a married couple or civil partners. 

The Court of Appeal refused to allow the new point as “(a) it would necessitate new evidence or (b), had it been run below, it would have resulted in the trial being conducted differently with regards to the evidence at the trial: Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360 at [17]”: judgment at [27]. 

Islington’s policy 

Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal were formulated as follows. 

1. The judge was wrong to decide the word “stepchild” was limited to situations where the parental couple were married or civil partners and should have adopted the approach in Rent Act cases that a modern family relationship was not confined to legal or blood relationships. 
2. The Court was wrong to find that including Ms Abdelrahman within the meaning of “stepchild” in the authority’s policy would be to expand, not interpret, the policy, with the appellant relying on particular modern dictionary definitions of “stepchild”. 

The Court of Appeal took all these matters under the heading “The interpretation of Islington’s policy” at [43]-[60]. It set out and held as follows. 

1. The Court was not required to interpret section 113, Housing |Act 1985; but to interpret Islington’s policy. 
2. Section 113 was a guide to the interpretation of the policy; but the policy remains the policy. 
3. Islington’s policy was a unilateral document, which it could withdraw or amend at any time. It was not the kind of document which was intended to remain in place indefinitely. Indeed, in this case it was clear that Islington’s current policy took into account “recent case law” which was plainly a reference to the decision in Sheffield CC v Wall [2010] EWCA Civ 922, [2011] 1 WLR 1342. 
4. Dictionaries never solve concrete problems of construction. Contemporaneous dictionary definitions strongly suggest that a “stepchild” is a child of a married person from a previous relationship, although that meaning has now to be slightly adapted to take account of civil partnerships. Other statutory definitions of “stepchild” also do not assist. They demonstrate that where Parliament wants to extend the meaning, it does so in terms. 
5. The purpose of the policy was to enable a closed category of readily identifiable candidates to succeed to a secure tenancy. The policy was designed to be capable of implementation by a tenancy officer with the minimum of investigation. To adopt the meaning of “stepchild” argued at trial was likely to lead to costly and time-consuming investigation or even litigation as to who is and who is not a stepchild. 

As a result, Ms Abdelrahman was not a “stepchild” under the authority’s policy and was not entitled to succeed.  

Article 14, ECHR discrimination 

The Court held that Ms Abdelrahman’s exclusion from the authority’s policy was not discrimination under article 14, ECHR: see paragraphs [61]-[97]. 

In short: 

“95. Islington’s policy is what has been described as a “bright line” rule. The formulation of “bright line” rules, particularly where there is a need to allocate, as fairly as possible, the scarce stock of social housing is unobjectionable, and in conformity with the ECHR, provided that the criteria are not arbitrary or discriminatory: Bah v United Kingdom [2012] HLR 12….” 

Section 3 Human Rights Act 1998  

Section 3, Human Rights Act 1998 was not engaged. It would only come to the rescue if Ms Abdelrahman’s Convention rights had been infringed. There had been no such finding. In any event, the Court was dealing with a policy and not statute: see paragraphs [99]-[100]. 

Sarah Salmon and Olivia Davies represented the successful Respondent authority, instructed by the London Borough of Islington’s Legal Services, Law & Governance, Resources Directorate. Olivia Davies also acted below.

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